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Abstract. The notion of online/oﬄine encryption was put forth by Guo,
Mu and Chen (FC 2008), where they proposed an identity-based scheme
called identity-based online/oﬄine encryption (IBOOE). An online/
oﬄine encryption separates an encryption into two stages: oﬄine
and online. The oﬄine phase carries much more computational load than
the online phase, where the oﬄine phase does not require the information
of the message to be encrypted and the identity of the receiver. Subsequently, many applications of IBOOE have been proposed in the literature. As an example, Hobenberger and Waters (PKC 2014) have recently
applied it to attribute-based encryption. In this paper, we move one step
further and explore a much more eﬃcient variant. We propose an eﬃcient
semi-generic transformation to obtain an online/oﬄine encryption from a
tradition identity-based encryption (IBE). Our transformation provides
a new method to separate the computation of receiver’s identity into
oﬄine and online phases. The IBOOE schemes using our transformation
saves one group element in both oﬄine and online phases compared to
other IBOOE schemes in identity computing. The transformed scheme
still maintains the same level of security as in the original IBE scheme.
Keywords: Identity-based encryption

1

· Online/oﬄine encryption

Introduction

Identity based encryption (IBE) was ﬁrst introduced by Shamir in 1984 [14]. In
an IBE system, each user’s public key can be an arbitrary string binding the
user’s identity, such as an email address or a telephone number. IBE removes
the necessity of complex certiﬁcate management that exists in traditional public
key cryptography. The need to incorporate certiﬁcates has been elimiated, and
hence, it removes complicated and costly certiﬁcate veriﬁcation processes. If a
new user wants to join the network in a network system based on IBE, there
is no need for other users in the network to verify its certiﬁcate in order to
communicate securely.
One of the main concerns in cryptography is the eﬃciency of computation. However, most IBE schemes [2,7,17] in cryptography involve computations
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including pairings over points on elliptic cure and exponentiations (point multiplications) in groups. These operations are regarded as the most costly computations in cryptography, which might be too costly to be applied in lightweight
devices. One elegant way to solve the problem was proposed to reduce the computational overhead of digital signature schemes by Even, Goldreich and Micali [6],
where a signing process is split into two phases. The ﬁrst phase is called the oﬄine
phase and is performed prior to obtaining the message to be signed. The second phase is called the online phase and is executed when the message becomes
available. All the heavy computations in signing phase are pre-computed in the
oﬄine phase. In the online phase, it only performs the light computations such
as modular multiplication.
The notion of online/oﬄine encryption was ﬁrst introduced by Guo, Mu
and Chen [8] in 2008, where they proposed an identity-based construction. The
motivation of online/oﬄine encryption is to improve the eﬃciency of encryption.
In the oﬄine phase, most of the heavy computations are conducted without the
need to know the recipient’s identity and the message to be encrypted. When
the recipient’s identity and the message become available, the online phase can
be accomplished with great eﬃciency. This seminal work has attracted a lot of
attention.
Guo, Mu and Chen [8] constructed the ﬁrst two identity-based IBOOE
schemes based on the IBE schemes of Boneh and Boyen [2] and Gentry [7].
Both IBOOE schemes were proven to be secure against chosen ciphertext attack
(CCA) without random oracle. Subsequently, a more eﬃcient IBOOE scheme
than Guo et al.’s scheme [8] was proposed by Liu and Zhou [10]. They proved
that their proposed scheme was CCA-secure in the random oracle model. However, Selvi, Vivek and Rangan [12,13] found that the scheme proposed by Liu
and Zhou [10] actually was not CCA secure and gave a concrete example of an
attack on conﬁdentiality. The adversary could easily forge a ciphertext and distinguish the challenge message in the security proof. The authors also proposed
a possible ﬁx for the weakness in [10]. This notion has been extended to various
areas such as attribute based encryption [9] and signcryption [18].
In an IBE system, the message space is quite limited such as in a cyclic group.
To optimize the encryption system for any arbitrary message, one can make use of
hybrid encryption. A useful tool called key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) was
proposed by Cramer and Shoup [5] to build a hybrid encryption scheme. A KEM
is similar to a public key encryption scheme, except that it encrypts a session
key K instead of a message. The message is encrypted using the session key with
a symmetry encryption system. Identity-based online/oﬄine key encapsulation
mechanism (IBOOKEM) is suﬃcient for practical applications. Therefore, with
IBOOKEM, the main work is how to split the encryption into oﬄine phase and
online phase, where the identity of receiver only appears in the online phase.
The IBOOKEM was ﬁrst proposed by Chow, Liu and Zhou [3]. It naturally
requires that the KEM is able to divide into online phase and oﬄine phase.
Based on their IBOOKEM, they presented a CCA secure IBOOE scheme in
the random oracle model and gave the general transformation from a one-way
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IBOOKEM scheme into a CCA IBOOE scheme. However, Selvi, Vivek and
Rangan [13] showed that there was one weakness in the proof of CCA security in [3], and hence, the scheme is insecure. Selvi, Vivek and Rangan [12,13]
proposed a new provably CCA secure and eﬃcient IBOOE scheme in the random oracle model. Subsequently, they revisited their IBOOE and constructed
signcryption schemes [13]. A practical IBOOE scheme for wireless sensor network in the selective ID model was proposed by Chu et al. [4]. Recently, Hohenberger and Waters [9] proposed the ﬁrst online/oﬄine attribute based encryption
(OOABE) scheme. Both schemes in their paper were selective chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) secure.
A more eﬃcient way to complete encryption and signature at the same time is
signcryption. An, Dodis and Rabin [1] proposed online/oﬄine signcryption. But
they only gave the general security proof notions and did not give their constructions. Sun et al. [15] provided the deﬁnition of the identity-based online/oﬄine
signcryption and the corresponding security model. Based on the work by Sun
et al., several online/oﬄine signcryption schemes have been proposed in the literature [13,16,18,19].
1.1

Our Contribution

In this paper, we introduce a new semi-generic transformation to split the computation of identity into online and oﬄine. Our transformation is more eﬃcient
than the previous transformation through the comparison in encryption computation and the ciphertext size. All the previous IBOOE schemes [3,10,12,13]
applied the technique introduced by Guo, Mu and Chen [8]. To deal with identity, they require at least two group elements in G and one element in Z∗p while
we only need one group element in G and one element in Z∗p . We reduce one
exponentiation operation in oﬄine computation and save one group element in
G both in oﬄine storage and ciphertext length. We provide the security proof of
our semi-generic transformation. We claim that the IBOOE schemes using our
semi-generic transformation hold the same security level as in the original IBE
schemes. Then we show a natural extension of IBE of Sakai and Kasahara [11],
Boneh and Boyen [2], Gentry [7] and Waters [17] applying our transformation.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we review some preliminaries including the deﬁnition of bilinear, identity-based online/oﬄine encryption and the
security model of IBOOE. Our semi-generic transformation, its security proof
and a comparison are provided in Section 3. Four examples of IBOOE schemes
converted by our transformation from the classical IBE schemes and our conclusion are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.

2

Preliminaries

In this section, we deﬁne bilinear pairing and identity-based online/oﬄine
encryption and then review the deﬁnition of security model for an IBOOE system. For simplicity, in this paper, we deﬁne an IBOOE as an IBOOKEM.
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Bilinear Pairing

Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group
of the same prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. A bilinear pairing is a map
e : G × G → GT with the following properties:


ab
1. Bilinear: For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have e ua , v b = e(u, v) .
2. Non-degeneracy: e (g, g) = 1.
3. Computability: It is eﬃcient to compute e (u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
2.2

Identity-Based Online/Oﬄine Encryption

An identity-based online/oﬄine encryption scheme consists of the following ﬁve
algorithms:
Setup(λ): Taking a security parameter λ as input and returns the system
parameters mpk and the master key msk. The system parameters mpk includes
the descriptions of a ﬁnite key space K, a ﬁnite message space M and a ﬁnite
ciphertext space CT . The system parameters are publicly known, while the master key is kept secretly and known to generator (PKG) only.
∗

KeyGen(mpk, msk, ID): Taking mpk, msk and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1} as
input, returns a private key dID for ID. Here ID is an arbitrary string which
will be used as a public key.
Taking the system parameter mpk as input, outputs a pair
Oﬀ-Encrypt(mpk):

Coﬀ , K where Coﬀ is called oﬄine ciphertext and K as the message encryption
key.
On-Encrypt(mpk, Coﬀ , ID): Taking the system parameters mpk, oﬄine
∗
ciphertext Coﬀ and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} as input, returns a ciphertext
CT for K.
Decrypt(mpk, CT , dID ): Taking the system parameters mpk, ciphertext CT
and the private key dID as input, outputs the session key K or a reject symbol ⊥.
For correctness we require that if for every (mpk, msk) returned

by Setup(λ),
every dID returned by KeyGen(mpk, msk, ID), every Coﬀ , K returned by
Oﬀ-Encrypt(mpk) and every CT returned by On-Encrypt(mpk, Coﬀ , ID),
then Decrypt(mpk, CT , dID ) = K.
2.3

Security for IBOOE

The semantic security between a challenger and an adversary is deﬁned as
follows.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a secure parameter λ and runs the Setup
algorithm. It gives the adversary A the system public parameters mpk.
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Phase 1: A issues polynomially private key queries q1 , . . . , qm . The challenger
responds by running key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate the private
key dIDi corresponding to IDi . It sends dIDi to A. These queries may be asked
adaptively, that is, each query qi may depend on the replies to q1 , . . . , qi−1 .
Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs an identity ID∗
on which it wishes to be challenged. A did not request a private key for ID∗
in Phase 1. The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes a
challenge ciphertext CT ∗ and a session key K0∗ corresponding to ID∗ . If b = 0,
the challenger sends (CT ∗ , K0∗ ) to A. Otherwise, the challenger sends (CT ∗ , K1∗ )
to A, where K1∗ is a random section key from key space.
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries qm+1 , . . . , qn on one restriction that
IDi = ID∗ . The challenger responds the same as in Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} of b and wins the game if b = b
We deﬁne adversary A’s advantage in attacking the above game is



1 


AdvA (λ) = Pr[b = b ] −  .
2
Deﬁnition 1. An IBOOE system is semantically secure if for any polynomial
time adversary A, the function AdvA (λ) is negligible.

3

Semi-Generic Transformation

In IBE system, the identity in ciphertext is embedded in some group elements.
We refer to those group elements containing identity as ID header. Therefore,
the ciphertext of IBE can be written as CT = (Hdr, C) where Hdr is called ID
header and C is the other components of ciphertext excluding ID header.
The IBE schemes in the literature [2,7,11,17] have the same ID headers in
the ciphertext, if we do not consider the group which the ID headers belong to.
Their ID headers are deﬁned as
 ID s
,
g1 g
where g1 , g are group elements of mpk and s ∈ Z∗p is the random number chosen
by the encryptor.
Without loss of generality, the encryption algorithm in IBE system can be
written as follow:
s

(C, K) ← E (mpk, s) ,
Hdr = g1 g ID ,

s 
CT = (Hdr, C) = g1 g ID , C ,
where K is the message encryption key and E is the encryption algorithm without
the computation of ID header.
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Based on the above scheme, we have the main task of IBOOE is to achieve the
online/oﬄine computation on the ID header. Obviously, there is a trivial method
to achieve online/oﬄine from IBE. We can compute C1 = g1s , C2 = g s in the
oﬄine phase and perform C3 = C1 · C2 ID after one has obtained the identity
in the online phase. However, one exponentiation operation is required in the
online phase to achieve the online/oﬄine encryption, which is still ineﬃcient.
In the following parts of this session, we ﬁrst revisit
the
s online/oﬄine com
putation on the ID header with structure Hdr = g1 g ID . Then we give our
improved semi-generic transformation that only needs two elements to deal with
the ID header to achieve online/oﬄine.
3.1

Previous Method of Transformation

We review how the authors dealt with the online/oﬄine computation of the ID
header in previous IBOOE schemes [3,8,12,13].
Oﬀ-Encrypt: Randomly choose α, β, s ∈ Z∗p and compute
s

C1 = (g1 g α ) , C2 = g sβ ,
(C, K) ← E (mpk, s) .


Then output the oﬄine ciphertext Coﬀ = C1 , C2 , α, β −1 , C and the message
encryption key K.
On-Encrypt: Upon receiving ID ∈ Z∗p , compute
C3 = β −1 (ID − α) mod p.
The ID header is Hdron = (C1 , C2 , C3 ). Then output the ciphertext
CT = (Hdron , C) = (C1 , C2 , C3 , C) .
In the decryption algorithm, the receiver ﬁrst recoves the general ID header
in the traditional IBE scheme from the ID header as below:
β −1 (ID−α)  ID s
s 
C1 · C2 C3 = (g1 g α ) · g sβ
= g1 g
.
It is the same as the ID header in IBE. Then, the receiver follows the general decryption procedures using its private key as in the traditional encryption
scheme to obtain the key K. It needs three elements to handle the ID header.
3.2

Our Method of Transformation

We describe our method to achieve the online/oﬄine encryption, where only two
elements are required to deal with the ID header. It saves one group element
compared to the previous method.

Author Proof

166

J. Lai et al.

Oﬀ-Encrypt: Randomly choose s, w ∈ Z∗p and compute
s

C1 = (g1 g w ) ,
(C, K) ← E (mpk, s) .
Then output the oﬄine ciphertext Coﬀ = (C1 , w, s, C) and the message encryption key K.
On-Encrypt: Upon receiving ID ∈ Z∗p , compute
C2 = s (ID − w) mod p.
The ID header is Hdron = (C1 , C2 ). Then output the ciphertext
CT = (Hdron , C) = (C1 , C2 , C) .
Correctness: Given the ID header Hdron = (C1 , C2 ), compute
s

s
C1 g C2 = (g1 g w ) · g s(ID−w) = g1 g ID .
After recovering the original ID header, the recipient follows the general decryption procedures using its private key as in traditional identity-based encryption
schemes to obtain the key K.
3.3

Security

Theorem 1. The identity-based online/oﬄine encryption scheme converted
with our transformation is secure if the original identity-based encryption scheme
is secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that has advantage ε (λ) against the IBOOE
scheme converted using our transformation. Then, there is a simulator B that
has advantage ε (λ) against the original IBE.
We show how to construct a simulator B that uses A to gain advantage ε (λ)
against IBE in Fig.1. Here, we refer the IBE as the oracle. The IBE and the
simulator B start the game with the IBE ﬁrst running the Setup algorithm of
IBE to generate the system public key mpk. As usual, G is a cyclic groups of
prime order p, and g is the generator of G. Random secret a ∈ Z∗p is the master
key and g1 = g a . The IBE gives mpk to simulator B. Simulator B is supposed to
output an identity ID∗ and expects to receive back the IBE challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ and the challenger session key K ∗ under mpk. Simulator B outputs its guess
b ∈ {0, 1} on K ∗ .
Simulator B works by interacting with adversary A as follows (B simulates
the challenger for A):
Setup: Simulator B gives mpk to A as the IBOOE system parameter.
Phase 1: The adversary A issues polynomially private key queries q1 , . . . , qm .
For the query on IDi from A, B queries its private key to IBE, then forwards
the results from IBE to A. These queries may be asked adaptively.
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B

1. (mpk, msk) ← Setup (λ)

mpk

−−−−−−−→

mpk

ID

←−−−−i−−−

dID

−−−−−−i−−→

ID

dID

−−−−−−i−−→
ID ∗

ID ∗

←−−−−−−−−
3. Output (CT ∗ , K ∗ ) where
CT ∗ = (Hdr∗ , C ∗ )

A

−−−−−−−→
←−−−−i−−−

2. Generate dIDi by running
KeyGen (mpk, msk, IDi )

(CT ∗ ,K ∗ )
−−−−−−−−−−→

167

←−−−−−−−−
(CTc∗h ,K ∗ )
Choose k ∈ Z∗p
−−−−−−−−−−→
C1∗ = Hdr∗ · g −k
C2∗ = k
Hdr∗ch = (C1∗ , C2∗ )


CT ∗ = Hdr∗ch , C ∗
ch

b

←−−−−−−−−

b

←−−−−−−−−

Fig. 1. Security Proof

Challenge: Once adversary A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs an ID∗
on which it wishes to be challenged. Simulator B responds as follows:
1. B gives IBE the challenge identity ID∗ . IBE responds with challenge ciphertext CT ∗ and the corresponding message encryption key K ∗ where



∗ s
CT ∗ = (Hdr∗ , C ∗ ) = g1 g ID
, C∗ .
2. Next, B randomly chooses k ∈ Z∗p and computes the challenge ID header:



 
∗ s
Hdr∗ch = (C1∗ , C2∗ ) = Hdr∗ · g −k , k = g1 g ID
g −k , k .


∗
Then, set the online/oﬄine challenge ciphertext as CTch
= Hdr∗ch , C ∗ . B


∗
responds to A with the online/oﬄine challenge ciphertext CTch
, K∗ .
∗
Note that CTch
is a valid IBOOE ciphertext under the identity ID∗ . To see this,
k
∗
let w = ID − s , we have



∗ s
s
C1∗ = g1 g ID
g −k = (g1 g w ) , C2∗ = k = s (ID∗ − w) .
Therefore,



s
Hdr∗ch = (C1∗ , C2∗ ) = (g1 g w ) , s (ID∗ − w)

is a valid online/oﬄine challenge ID header for the challenge identity ID∗ .
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Phase 2: A issues more private key queries qm+1 , . . . , qn on one restriction that
IDi = ID∗ . B responds as in Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} on K ∗ . Simulator B outputs b as
its guess.
It is obvious that if the adversary A has advantage ε (λ) to break the IBOOE
scheme converted by our transformation, simulator B has advantage ε (λ) to
break the original IBE scheme.
3.4

Comparison

In an IBOOKEM system, there is no message to be encrypted. Therefore, it
is important that how to eﬃciently compute ID header from KEM system to
achieve IBOOKEM, which greatly aﬀects the eﬃciency of IBOOKEM system.
Here, we provide a comparison of computation cost of computing ID header and
the ID header size among the traditional IBE, previous transformation and our
transformation. We denote by E the exponentiation in group G and mc the
modular multiplication in Z∗p .
Table 1. Comparison of Computing ID header for IBOOE

Oﬄine computation
Online computation
Oﬄine storage
Ciphertext size

Traditional IBE

2E

1G

[8],[3],[12],[13]
3E
1mc
2G + 2Zp
2G + 1Zp

[10]
5E
2mc
3G + 4Zp
3G + 2Zp

Ours
2E
1mc
1G + 2Zp
1G + 1Zp

From Table 1, it is clear that the online/oﬄine encryption has a larger
size of ID header than traditional IBE. However, the online/oﬄine method
can greatly reduce the online computation which is the motivation to use the
online/oﬄine encryption. Our semi-generic transformation of computing the ID
deader is more eﬃcient than the previous transformation to achieve identitybased online/oﬄine encryption. The previous transformation requires two group
elements in G and one element in Z∗p to deal with identity while we only need
one group element in G and one element in Z∗p . We reduce one exponentiation operation in the oﬄine computation and save one group element in G
both in oﬄine storage and ciphertext length. We claim that the identity-based
encryption schemes with this kind of ID header can be eﬃciently converted to
online/oﬄine encryption schemes by our method.

4

Identity Based Online/Oﬄine Encryption Schemes

In this section, we give four examples applying our transformation to achieve the
online/oﬄine encryption from the classical identity-based encryption schemes
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[2,7,11,17]. Four IBOOE schemes are given in the form of key encapsulation.
Their security are easy to prove according to the original schemes. We omit
their security proofs here. We also claim that the ﬁrst example is a CPAsecure identity-based online/oﬄine key encapsulation mechanism scheme with
the shortest ciphertext.
4.1

IBOOE from Sakai-Kasahara IBE [11]

Setup: The system parameters are generated as follow. The PKG randomly
∗
chooses α ∈ Z∗p and sets g1 = g α . Let H1 : {0, 1} → Z∗p be the cryptographic
hash function. The public parameters mpk and msk are given by
mpk = (G, GT , q, g, g1 , H1 ) ,

msk = α.
∗

KeyGen: To generate the private key for ID ∈ {0, 1} , PKG computes
1

dID = g H1 (ID)+α .
Oﬀ-Encrypt: Randomly choose x, y ∈ Z∗p and compute
x

K = e(g, g) ,

x

C1 = (g1 g y ) .

Output the oﬄine ciphertext Coﬀ = (C1 , x, y) and the session key K. Note that
e (g, g) can be pre-computed by the PKG in Setup phase as part of the public
parameters mpk. Thus, there is no pairing to be computed in the oﬄine phase.
On-Encrypt: To generate a ciphertext for ID, compute
C2 = x (H1 (ID) − y) mod p.
Output the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 ) corresponding to the session key K.
Decrypt: Upon receiving the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 ), to recover the session
key, the recipient decrypts the ciphertext using the private key dID and computes


K = e C1 · g C2 , dID .
According to our transformation, it is easy to check its correctness
x




1
x
e C1 · g C2 , dID = e g1 g H1 (ID) , g H1 (ID)+α = e(g, g) = K.
4.2

IBOOE from Boneh-Boyen IBE [2]

Setup: PKG randomly chooses a secret a ∈ Zp , generators g, g2 , h1 ∈ G and
sets g1 = g a . The system public parameters mpk and master key msk are
mpk = (g, g1 , g2 , h1 ) ,

msk = g2a .
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KeyGen: To generate the private key for ID ∈ Zp , PKG picks a random r ∈ Zp
and computes
 
r 
dID = (d1 , d2 ) = g2a h1 g1ID , g r .
Oﬀ-Encrypt: Randomly chooses w, s ∈ Zp , compute
s

K = e(g1 , g2 ) ,

s

C1 = (h1 g1w ) ,

C2 = g s .

Output the oﬄine ciphertext Coﬀ = (C1 , C2 , w, s) and session key K.
On-Encrypt: To generate a ciphertext for an identity ID ∈ Zp , compute
C3 = s (ID − w) mod p.
Then output the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) corresponding to the session
key K.
Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) for ID ∈ Zp and recover
the session key, the receiver uses its private key dID and computes
s

C0 = C1 · g1C3 = h1 g1ID ,

K=

e (d1 , C2 )
.
e (C0 , d2 )

For a valid ciphertext, we have
 
r 
e g2a h1 g1ID , g s
e (d1 , C2 )

 = e(g1 , g2 )s = K.

=
s
e (C0 , d2 )
e h1 g1ID , g r
4.3

IBOOE from Gentry IBE [7]

Setup: PKG randomly chooses a ∈ Zp and generators g, h ∈ G and sets g1 = g a .
The system parameters mpk and the master key msk are
mpk = (g, g1 , h) ,

msk = a.

KeyGen: To generate the private key for ID ∈ Zp , PKG picks a random r ∈ Zp
and outputs
 
 1 
dID = (d1 , d2 ) = r, hg −r a−ID .
Oﬀ-Encrypt: Randomly choose w, s ∈ Zp and compute
s

−s
s
K = e(g, h) , C1 = g1 g −w ,
C2 = e(g, g) .
Then output the oﬄine ciphertext Coﬀ = (C1 , C2 , w, s) and session key K.
On-Encrypt: To generate a ciphertext for an identity ID ∈ Zp , the sender
computes
C3 = s (w − ID) mod p.
Then output the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) corresponding to the session
key K.
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Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) with ID and recover
the session key, the recipient computes
s
s


C0 = C1 · g C3 = g1 g −w · g s(w−ID) = g1 g −ID ,
K=

4.4

1
.
e (C0 , d2 ) · C2 d1

IBOOE from Waters’ Dual System IBE [17]

Setup: Let G be a group of prime order p. The PKG chooses generators g, v, v1 ,
v2 , w, u, h ∈ G and a1 , a2 , b, α ∈ Zp . Let τ1 = vv1a1 , τ2 = vv2a2 . The system public
parameters mpk and the master key msk are


α·a ·b
,
mpk = g b , g a1 , g a2 , g b·a1 , g b·a2 , τ1 , τ2 , τ1b , τ2b , w, u, h, e(g, g) 1
msk = {g, g α , g α·a1 , v, v1 , v2 } .
KeyGen: To generate the private key for identity ID ∈ Zp , the PKG randomly
chooses r1 , r2 , z1 , z2 , tagk ∈ Zp . Let r = r1 + r and computes
 −z1
 −z2
D1 = g α·a1 v r , D2 = g −α v1r g z1 , D3 = g b
, D4 = v2r g z2 , D5 = g b
,

r1
D6 = g r2 ·b , D7 = g r1 , R = uID wtagk h .
The private key is
dID = (D1 , . . . , D7 , R, tagk ) .
Oﬀ-Encrypt: Choose random s1 , s2 , t, x, tagc ∈ Zp and let s = s1 + s2 and
compute:

s
s 1
 s1 +s2

α·a ·b 2
s
K = e(g, g) 1
, C1 = g b
, C2 = g b·a1 , C3 = (g a1 ) 1 ,
s 2

s
C4 = g b·a2 , C5 = (g a2 ) 2 , C6 = τ1s1 τ2s2 ,
 s1  b s2 −t

t
τ2 w , E1 = ux wtagc h , E2 = g t .
C7 = τ1b
Then output the oﬄine ciphertext
Coﬀ = (C1 , . . . , C7 , E1 , E2 , tagc )
and the session key K.
On-Encrypt: To generate a ciphertext for an identity ID ∈ Zp , compute
C8 = t (ID − x) mod p.
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Then output the ciphertext CT = (C1 , . . . , C8 , E1 , E2 , tagc ) corresponding to
the session key K.
Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext CT = (C1 , . . . , C8 , E1 , E2 , tagc ) with ID,
the receiver ﬁrst checks tagc , if tagc = tagk , outputs invalid. Otherwise, the
receiver computes

t

t
E3 = E1 · uC8 = ux wtagc h · ut(ID−x) = uID wtagc h ,
A1 = e (C1 , D1 ) · e (C1 , D1 ) · e (C1 , D1 ) · e (C1 , D1 ) · e (C1 , D1 )
α·a ·b·s
b(s +s )r
a bs r
a bs r
= e(g, g) 1 2 e(v, g) 1 2 e(v1 , g) 1 1 e(v2 , g) 2 2
Since r = r1 + r2 , we have
A2 = e (C6 , D6 )·e (C7 , D7 ) = e(v, g)
A3 =
A4 =

b(s1 +s2 )r

a1 bs1 r

e(v1 , g)

a2 bs2 r

e(v2 , g)

−r1 t

e(g, w)

,

A1
α·a ·b·s
r t
= e(g, g) 1 2 e(g, w) 1 ,
A2

e (E3 , D7 )
e (E2 , R)

1
tagc −tagk

r1 t

= e(g, w)

.

Finally, the receiver can recover the session key by computing
K=

5

A3
.
A4

Conclusion

We proposed a semi-generic transformation to transform IBE into IBOOE.
Our
s

transformation is applicable to those IBE schemes whose ID header is g1 g ID .
In comparison with traditional IBOOE schemes, our transformation saves one
group element in both oﬄine storage and ciphertext length and reduces one
exponentiation operation in oﬄine computation. We proved that our transformation is secure if the IBE scheme is secure. We presented four examples of IBE
of Sakai and Kasahara [11], Boneh and Boyen [2], Gentry [7] and Waters [17] by
applying our transformation.
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